

VOTING GAP BY ORIGIN¹

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Abstract

This study examines the voting patterns of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi citizens in ten general elections held since the early 2000s in rural and urban areas in Israel, utilizing a new classification method of origin of immigrants and their descendants based on surnames, alongside the traditional classification by continent of birth. The study reveals relatively sharp fluctuations across elections in the size of an origin gap in voting for a right-wing party bloc between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi. According to the empirical analysis, the origin voting gap in the general elections held in 2022 was five times the gap found in the elections held in 2006, and more than twice that of the elections held in 2009. Sharp fluctuations in the voting gap undermine the protest vote hypothesis that discrimination against immigrants of Mizrahi origin in the past is the main factor behind their current political behavior. In all ten elections examined, the gap in voting for the right-wing party bloc between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi voters disappears or decreases considerably when differences in the level of education and degree of religiosity are neutralized. This study also reveals an interesting trend in the political behavior of voters with high education level. They have been more likely to vote for the center-left bloc in recent elections, in contrast to their similar support for both blocs recorded in previous elections.

Key Words: Voting behavior, voting gap, origins, protest vote hypothesis, discrimination

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1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work is to estimate the size of the origin gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi citizens in voting for the right-wing party bloc in the last ten general (Knesset) elections in Israel, offering a new method of classifying origin of immigrants and their descendants based on surnames, in addition to the traditional classification method by continent of birth. According to the new method, 440 small Jewish settlements were classified into one of three origin groups according to the most common surnames in the settlement in 2017 (ICBS, 2019). A settlement is classified as Mizrahi if at least two of the three most common surnames in the settlement are typical of Mizrahi such as Dahan and Biton. Likewise, a settlement is defined as Ashkenazi if at least two of the three most common surnames in the settlement are typical of Ashkenazi, such as Friedman and Stern. A settlement that was not classified as Mizrahi or Ashkenazi was defined as mixed. For atypical surnames, the origin is determined according to the most common country of birth of the holders of the surname.²

A method of classifying the origin of individuals and communities according to surnames is an alternative to the conventional method based on continent of birth. The need for an alternative method of classifying origin arises from a lack of information about the continent of birth of the parents of first and second-generation Israelis, comprising 22 percent of the current Jewish population in Israel. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) also does not usually publish data that includes the origins of third and fourth generations Israelis, and this segment is expected to expand over time. Classification of origin by surname may also capture a sense of social identity, and this is another potential benefit of this method. Method of classification of origin by last name is not without flaws, and it may be biased in identifying the origin of settlements due to differences in the relative frequency of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi names, differences between the two groups of origin in the tendency to change surnames, differences in residential patterns and interaction between them. The method is more suitable for classifying relatively small and homogeneous settlements, and this is another limitation. To learn about the degree of interchangeability between the two definitions of origin, the estimates of the voting gap according to the surname and by continent of birth will be presented.

This study shows that in the Knesset elections held in November 2022, the bloc of right-wing parties received approximately 61 percent of the votes in Mizrahi communities compared to approximately 36 percent in Ashkenazi communities, and thus the voting gap is equal to approximately 25 percentage points. An analysis of the voting results based on actual ballots in the last ten Knesset elections reveals relatively large volatility in the voting gap between the two social groups: the lowest voting gap, only about 5 percentage points, was in the elections held in March 2006, while the largest gap, more than 25 percentage points,

² I thank Abiel Kranzler from the Central Bureau of Statistics who provided these data.

observed in the elections held in November 2022. Sharp fluctuations and in the same direction were also found when the origin classification of settlements is by continent of birth and also in urban areas within large and medium-sized cities. This similarity in the findings increases the confidence to consider the classification by surnames as another methodology for identifying the origin of individuals and groups.

In all ten election systems examined, the gap in voting for the right-wing party bloc between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi communities disappears if the differences in characteristics such as the level of education and degree of religiosity are controlled for. Even according to a definition of origin based on the continent of birth, the origin gap in voting is significantly smaller using data on settlements and urban neighborhoods within the cities (statistical areas), but it does not disappear. The proportion of votes for the right-wing bloc decreases as the level of education, income, and median age increase, and is higher in religious settlements and lower in ultra-Orthodox settlements and kibbutzim. Contrary to the theory of the median voter (assuming one-dimensional elections on the tax rate and scope of redistribution), voters with high income level, from both origin groups, tend to vote less for right-wing parties, which in recent years have offered voters a right-wing economic policy as well. These findings are true whether the definition of origin is by surname or continent of birth, which opens the door to use of surname-based definition when data on continent of birth is missing or unavailable.

Over the course of ten election campaigns, there was a change in the coefficient of education, in contrast to the relative stability of all other coefficients. In the four elections from 2003 to 2013, voters with high education were equally likely to support the bloc of right-wing parties as the bloc of left-wing parties. However, the coefficient of high education became negative and sizable in the last six election cycles. This shift in the political behavior of educated people, who now tend to support left-wing parties more than in the past, was also observed in the US, France, and the UK (Piketty 2021).

Naturally, there is concern about the degree of external validity of the findings based on data from small settlements, which make up a few percent of the general population. However, this concern is reduced because the share of votes for the right-wing bloc in the investigated settlements is similar to the actual vote share in the general population. Using surname-based definition, the difference is less than one percentage point over the last ten electoral cycles. In addition, the empirical analysis of the voting disparity in urban neighborhoods, which covers the vast majority of the population, paints a similar picture. Moreover, a similar voting gap was found based on a representative survey of the Israeli population (2020 Berman).

This work joins a series of studies that have analyzed elections held in Israel in the twentieth³ and twenty-first centuries.⁴ The voting gap by origin for the Knesset fascinated political scientists and sociologists already after the first elections of the young state of Israel (Matras 1965, Lissak 1969, Arian 1973). Researchers tried to understand why Jewish immigrants from Christian countries born in Europe or the US preferred left leaning parties such as Mapai (Labor party), while Jewish immigrants from Islamic countries born in Asia or Africa tended to vote more for right leaning parties such as Herut (later Likud). The hope that this voting disparity between the two social groups would disappear among the children of the immigrants, whose parents came from different continents, did not materialize. The voting gap in the generation born in Israel was of a similar magnitude to the gap in the immigrant generation, and sometimes even larger (Shamir and Arian 1982).

The voting gap was relatively small in the national elections that took place in the first two decades of the state. The large waves of immigration in the 1950s and 1960s, which changed the composition of the Israeli population by continent of origin, did not bring about a political change in the ruling coalition. Mapai, and then the HaMa'arach (Alignment) party, continued to hold the steering wheel even though the Israeli population changed its face, as the voting gap was small. In the 1973 election campaign, the difference in voting patterns between those born in Asia-Africa and their descendants and those born in Europe-US and their descendants deepened (Shamir and Arian 1982), and thus with a lag in time, the change in the composition of the population manifested itself in political transformations that contributed to undermining the hold of the traditional ruling party. After the voting gap reached its peak in 1984 (Shamir and Arian 1999, Berman 2021), a considerable retreat was recorded, and it seemed that the political and social divide between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi gave way to other issues in the elections that took place between 2006–13 (Berman 2021). However, just as it seemed that the hope for its departure was coming true, the social gap discourse stormed back into the public debate and the political arena (Ben-Haim 2022).

Examining the Knesset voting gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi is important not only because of its presence in the public discourse. Voting based on social group affiliation undermines the democratic process of replacing a failed administration and rewarding a successful one with an additional term. Clan-like voting may suppress the marketplace of ideas and is a recipe for inefficiency in the provision of public goods (Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2012).

³ See Arian 1973, Peres and Shemer 1984, Ayalon et al. 1987, Shelov and Kish 2001, Yaish 2003, Arian 1975, Shamir and Arian 1982, Smootha 1993 and Shamir and Arian 1999.

⁴ See Levy, Sporta and Rosenthal 2022, Sorek and Ceobanu 2021, Yuchtman-Yaar et al. 2018, and Berman 2021.

2. METHODOLOGY

The main goal is to examine whether voter origin affects voting patterns, taking into account differences in the economic, demographic, and social characteristics of the residents of the settlements, using the following statistical model:

$$(1) Y_i = a_0 + a_1(Origin)_i + a_2(SES)_i + a_3(Religious)_i + a_4(Imm)_i + a_5(Kibbutz)_i + u_i$$

where the dependent variable, Y_i represents the percentage of votes received by the bloc of right-wing parties or Likud in the Knesset elections in locality i (Appendix Table 1 lists the parties that were included in the right-wing bloc). This model was estimated separately for each of the last ten elections.

Measuring behavior that is carried out behind a curtain such as casting a ballot in the ballot box is one of the main challenges of investigating voting patterns, which is the dependent variable in this work. The usual way to deal with this challenge is to rely on surveys before and after elections that depend on the nature of the cooperation of the respondents. This way may fail the researchers if a nonnegligible part of those surveyed refuse to cooperate, or provide incorrect information intentionally or accidentally, especially if this behavior is correlated with voting patterns.

The complementary approach is to use actual data but at the locality level. The advantage of using actual behavior instead of self-reported intentions (pre-election surveys) or self-reported behavior (post-election surveys) increases as the respondents' degree of trust in election surveys decreases. The decline in trust in institutions does not spare election pollsters either, and there is systematic evidence of a refusal rate as high as 20 percent of the respondents (Cavari and Freedman 2022), and anecdotal evidence of maliciously misleading voting designed to fail the pollsters. The advantage of survey-based studies is the availability of information on voting at the individual level, but at the cost of the lack of information on actual behavior. In contrast, the advantage of locality-based studies is the availability of actual election results, but at the cost of the lack of information on the individual's characteristics. For this reason, this work should be seen as a complement and not a substitute for survey-based studies.⁵

The main disadvantage of using data at the locality level compared to individual data is a possible fallacy of inference, according to which an empirical relationship between two variables at the locality level does not reflect the true relationship at the individual level. To illustrate, suppose that Ashkenazi who tend to vote for Likud also tend to live in settlements

⁵ Michael Shalev and Abraham Diskin are among the few who have studied divisions and political behavior based on actual voting data of groups where the definition of origin is according to the continent of birth of the voters (Diskin 2001, Shalev and Kish 2001, Shalev et al. 2000,). An analysis based on localities or neighborhoods was done in the distant past in the investigation of the first elections (Matras 1965, Lissak 1969).

with an increased presence of Mizrahi. Assume as well that Mizrahi vote equally for Likud and other parties. A correlation at the locality level will show that settlements with a larger proportion of Mizrahi tend to vote for Likud, even though by assumption there should not be such a relationship. Such inference failure may also arise due to inequality. Suppose that the tendency to vote to the right increases with the growth in wealth, and the richer locality is also characterized by great inequality. A look at the vote in the wealthier locality will reveal that the share of voting for the right is actually lower due to the large number of people with low incomes, who, by assumption, vote for the left. That is, a negative relationship was found between wealth and voting for the right at the locality level, although the relationship is positive by design at the individual level.

To minimize the fear of such an inference failure, the empirical analysis is based on settlements that have a small population with maximum homogeneity within a settlement in terms of the origin of the residents (a large proportion of Mizrahi/Ashkenazi), and maximum heterogeneity between settlements (see discussion below).

The independent variable at the center of this work is Origin, which indicates the origin of the settlement with the help of a list of three variables for the following three groups of origin: Mizrahi, Ashkenazi and mixed. The next section shows how the settlements are classified into the three origin groups.

SESi denotes a decile according to the value of the socioeconomic index of the residents of locality i in 2017. To learn about the marginal contribution of education, income and demographics, this work also uses three separate variables included in the socioeconomic index: percentage of people with an academic degree aged 27–54 in the locality, average monthly income per capita in the locality, and the median age of the locality's residents.

Religiosity was found to be an important factor in predicting voting in previous studies based on self-reporting in election surveys, therefore this variable is included in the list of control variables. Religiosity is represented here by a vector of three dummy variables for religiosity: ultra-Orthodox, Religious, and Traditional or secular settlement. The definition of the settlement's religiosity is according to its description in Wikipedia (see below). The expectation is that support for the right-wing bloc depends on the degree of religiosity.

The empirical estimation adopts a common practice that treats the immigrants of the 1990s separately due to a possible difference in their political behavior compared to other European-American immigrants. The variable Imm expresses the share of immigrants from 1990 onward. The justification for separating the immigrants from the veterans who originate from the European continent is getting weaker because more than three decades have passed since the beginning of that wave of immigration.

The variable "Kibbutz" takes the value of one if the settlement is a kibbutz, and zero otherwise. This variable captures differences in the degree of secularism and ideological position, as kibbutzim traditionally tend to vote more for center-left parties. Controlling for this variable also allows for the adjustment of the excessive share of kibbutzim in the investigated settlements (21 percent) relative to their actual share in the Jewish population.

3. THE DEFINITION OF LOCALITY ORIGIN

This study presents a new methodology for defining the origin of a locality (or statistical area) based on the frequency of surnames of its residents, in addition to the conventional definition of origin, which relies on the continent of birth of its residents. The origin of the investigated settlements is defined using data on the most common surnames in the settlements in 2017 (ICBS, 2019). The study focuses on small (Jewish) settlements with less than two thousand inhabitants, where the four most common surnames constitute 10 percent or more of the population of the locality. While the ICBS published the share of the four most common last names, it listed only three of them without their respective shares. Furthermore, the study is confined to settlements with available voting data for all ten of the last Knesset elections.

Settlements in which at least two of the three most common surnames are known to be distinctly Mizrahi, such as Biton or Peretz, were classified as Mizrahi. Additionally, surnames that also serve as familiar first names, such as David or Moshe, were defined as Mizrahi. Similarly, a settlement is classified as Ashkenazi if at least two of the three most common surnames are known to be distinctly Ashkenazi, such as Warmstein and Lieberman. This dichotomous separation ensures great homogeneity within settlements and significant heterogeneity between settlements, thus reducing the risk of inference failure. Finally, all settlements not classified as Mizrahi or Ashkenazi were categorized as mixed, which includes surnames such as Cohen and Levi. For the purpose of classifying the origin of settlements, 1,110 surnames were examined, including 544 Ashkenazi surnames, 389 Mizrahi surnames, and 177 mixed or unidentified surnames. The assignment of surnames to a group of origin was done based on informed judgment, while the origin of less common surnames was determined according to the frequency of surnames by country of birth.

The necessity for an additional tool to identify ancestry is grounded in the diminishing availability of data on the country of birth of the grandparents of the Israeli-born (third generation) and their parents (fourth generation). Although researchers can acquire this information partially, it requires a substantial investment of time and money, and yet data on the origin of 22 percent of the Jewish population is unavailable. Note that defining the origin of respondents born in Israel in recent election surveys or distinguishing between immigrants of the 1990s and those of European origin is increasingly challenging (Berman 2021).

A definition based on the continent of birth is objective but does not necessarily indicate whether a person of Asian or African descent feels that s/he belongs to the social group known as Mizrahi, and the same is true of people of European and American descent. Indeed, most Mizrahi or Ashkenazi define themselves as Israelis or Jews and not according to their seemingly social group (Lewin-Epstein and Cohen 2018). Self-reported social identity in a survey is a natural source of information to capture Israelis' subjective sense of social belonging, but such information is not available for small settlements and urban neighborhoods. Even if there were survey data on a subjective sense of social affiliation, self-

reporting may not necessarily reflect true identity because it's possible that it subconsciously shapes behavior in a way that the individual may not always be aware of. Sgroi et al. (2021) demonstrate that identity components such as language, preferred food menu, and the grandmother's birth region in Italy (south or north) predict trust in the government, willingness to pay taxes, and cooperation, while reported identity lacks any predictive power for these important variables.

To the extent that a surname captures social identity, defining origin based on surnames is preferable to defining origin by continent of birth. Surnames and first names may be important components of a person's identity and belonging to a defined social group (Althusser 1971, Elias 1991, Sue and Telles 2007, Finch 2008, Plicher 2016). Furthermore, information about the surname is visible and might reveal a person's affiliation, as opposed to the country of birth.

According to ICBS data, 12.5 percent of Jewish men changed last name during their lifetime (ICBS 2017) which implies that most of them choose to keep their original surname, and this decision may implicitly indicate the significance of group affiliation embodied in the surname. It is reasonable to assume that people who changed their last name to a generic Hebrew name such as Golan and Bar, (which are common last names in Israel) may feel less belonging to a certain social group compared to people who did not change their last name.

The decision to retain the original last name may involve economic and social costs. Rubinstein and Brenner showed that workers from mixed families with a father of Mizrahi origin earn 7 percent less than workers from mixed families with a father of Ashkenazi origin (Rubinstein and Brenner 2013). They attributed this to differences in surnames, which allow employers to discriminate against Mizrahi workers. The costs associated with a minority first and last name have been documented in other countries such as the US (Figlio 2005, Goldstein and Stecklov 2016) and the UK (Wood et al. 2009).

Nevertheless, there are disadvantages to the method of classifying ancestry by surname. First, the number of settlements classified into a particular origin group is likely to be greater if it is characterized by few surnames, and vice versa. Second, the number of settlements by origin group, especially the mixed group, depends on the tendency to change surnames. Third, systematic differences in residence patterns by surname may affect the number of settlements by origin group. Finally, a definition based on surnames is suitable for classifying small and relatively homogeneous settlements.

4. DATA

Definition of origin: Table 1.1 shows the number of settlements according to definition of origin based on surnames. According to this origin classification method, there are 201 Mizrahi settlements, 63 Ashkenazi settlements, and 176 mixed settlements. Thus, the overall number of settlements that meet the 10 percent threshold (the share of four most common

surnames) with available data on elections results) is 440. The size of the population in these settlements is hundreds of residents, which reduces the risk of inference failure. However, the number of voters in these settlements constitutes only about 4 percent of the voters in the Jewish population in Israel and raises a question of representativeness of the voting patterns (see below).

The share of population originating from Asia and Africa in Mizrahi settlements is 55 percent, and is considerably larger compared to the share of the population of Asian and African origin (16 percent) in settlements defined as Ashkenazi, and vice versa (Table 1.1). The share of residents originating from the continents of Asia and Africa is similar to the share of residents of European and American origin in settlements defined as mixed. These descriptive statistics suggest that surname-based definition captures the true origin of residents.

To construct the conventional definition based on the continent of birth, settlements were arranged in ascending order according to the ratio of Mizrahi residents to the total of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi residents (excluding residents of mixed origin). A settlement was categorized as Mizrahi if it ranked in the upper quarter of settlements based on this ratio, and as Ashkenazi if it fell in the lower quarter. Settlements located between the upper and lower quarters were categorized as mixed settlements.

While defining the origin of a settlement in a dichotomous manner makes it easier to interpret the coefficient of the origin variable, it comes at the cost of accuracy, as Ashkenazi individuals may reside in settlements defined as Mizrahi, and vice versa. However, this inaccuracy diminishes concerning the voting gap, as Ashkenazi residents in a Mizrahi settlement are partially offset by Mizrahi residents in an Ashkenazi settlement.

The share of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi residents is calculated for Jewish settlements with less than 2,000 inhabitants for which information is available on voting patterns in the last ten elections and data on the continent of origin of the settlement's residents. The overall number settlements in Israel is 1,218, but applying the second definition of origin covers 800 settlements, after removing Jewish 164 cities and towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants, 128 Arab cities and towns, 93 settlements without information on voting data, and 33 settlements without continent of birth data.

Applying an origin definition based on the continent of birth, Table 1.2 reveals that the number of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi settlements is equal at 200, which is higher compared to an origin definition based on surnames. The settlements exhibit greater homogeneity in terms of origin composition when using the continent of birth-based definition as opposed to the surname-based definition (Tables 1.1-1.2). The proportion of residents with Mizrahi origin in settlements classified as Mizrahi by surname (definition 1) is lower compared to an origin definition based on the continent of birth (definition 2). Conversely, the proportion of Ashkenazi residents in settlements classified as Mizrahi according to definition 1 is higher compared to definition 2. Ashkenazi settlements also demonstrate greater homogeneity using definition 2.

Voting data: The source of voting data by party is the Central Election Committee, and it includes information on the number of eligible voters and votes by party and locality. This study covers ten Knesset elections held in the third millennium, from 2003 to 2022. Because of the focus on party voting patterns, this study does not cover the elections for Prime Minister held in 2001 (the last prime ministerial elections that took place in Israel).


The list of parties in the right-wing bloc until the elections to the 21st Knesset was determined according to Berman's classification (Berman 2020; table A1). In later elections (2019–22), the parties were classified according to a similar approach (Appendix Table 1). The classification of "Kadima" in 2006, which is not one of the right-wing parties, requires special consideration because of the political explosion that occurred before the 2006 election campaign. Toward the end of 2005, the "Kadima" party was established by Likud leavers led by Ariel Sharon and they were joined by key figures who left the Labor party, such as Shimon Peres, Haim Ramon, and Dalia Itzik. The new party "Kadima" was born following the implementation of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria (the Disengagement Plan). The Disengagement Plan created internal political unrest within the Likud, which led Ariel Sharon to decide that the Likud party was no longer suitable for its supporters. Kadima, which was associated with the Disengagement Plan, won a similar number of seats in the 2006 and 2009 elections (29 and 28 seats, respectively). To this day, prominent right-wing parties, including the Likud, view the Disengagement Plan with a hostile eye. Given that context, I adopted Berman's classification (Berman 2020) which left "Kadima" outside the bloc of right-wing parties.

The voting patterns in small settlements using surname-based definition (definition 1) are similar to the general (Jewish) population, which reduces the fear of lacking representativeness. The average difference over the last ten elections is less than one percentage point on average when comparing the votes for the right-wing bloc in the investigated settlements to the actual votes received by this bloc in the general (Jewish) population in most of the recent elections (see Appendix Table 2). The difference between the share of votes for the right-wing bloc in the 800 researched settlements (definition 2) and the share of votes in the general (Jewish) population is 7 percentage points on average over the last ten elections, which suggests that definition 1 is better in terms of representativeness.

A look at the voting patterns according to religiosity (Appendix Table 3) gives credibility to the religiosity classification of settlements. The bloc of right-wing parties received significantly more votes in religious settlements, according to the classification that will be presented immediately, compared to ultra-Orthodox and secular or traditional settlements. In settlements defined as ultra-Orthodox, the right-wing bloc receives about 42 percent of the vote, with the ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionism parties enjoying overwhelming support. The right-wing bloc in the elections to the 25th Knesset in settlements classified as religious received 74 percent of the votes, but with a significant change in the composition of the parties: Religious Zionism and Likud share the majority of the votes. Compared to ultra-


Orthodox and religious settlements, support for the right-wing party bloc drops to about a third of the votes cast in settlements defined as traditional or secular.

Table 2 shows the share of votes for the bloc of right-wing parties in the last ten elections. About 61 percent of the votes in settlements classified as Mizrahi according to surnames went to the right-wing party bloc in the elections to the 25th Knesset held in 2022, and this compared to about 36 percent of the votes in settlements defined as Ashkenazi according to the same method, and thus the voting gap stands at about 25 percentage points. The support for the bloc of right-wing parties in settlements classified as mixed is quite close to that found in Ashkenazi settlements. This table also reveals the great volatility in the voting gap between elections. The gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in voting for the right-wing party bloc was only about 5 percentage points in the elections in 2006, and reached a peak of more than 25 percentage points in the elections held in November 2022. It is important to note that 2006 is not an unusual observation that might be influenced by the birth of the Kadima party. A low gap (8 percentage points) between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in voting for the bloc of right-wing parties was also recorded in the elections in 1999, which is not covered in this study. Figure 1 presents the voting gap for the bloc of right-wing parties according to two definitions of origin with a confidence interval, and it shows that the voting gap in the 2006 elections is not significantly different from zero.

Figure 1

To assess the reliability of the origin definition based on surnames, I also calculated the average voting gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi by randomly selecting one of the settlements classified as Mizrahi and treating it as an Ashkenazi ("reversed" settlement). A similar calculation was performed for two settlements, three settlements, and so forth (100 times). The results are depicted in Figure 2, with the X-axis representing the number of "reversed" settlements and the Y-axis representing the voting gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi. An unreliable origin classification would exhibit a constant voting gap with a stable confidence interval, regardless of the number of "reversed" settlements. Instead, the chart illustrates that the voting gap decreases, and the confidence interval widens as the number of "reversed" settlements increases. This serves as another indication that classification by surname captures the true origin of the residents.

Figure 2



The voting gap for the bloc of right-wing parties is much larger according to the continent of birth-based definition. Table 1.2 shows that the voting gap is about 42 percentage points in the elections held in 2022. The higher voting gap mainly reflects a lower rate of support for the bloc of right-wing parties in Ashkenazi settlements, without a noticeable change in the support of the residents of Mizrahi settlements (tables 1.1-1.2). Note that settlements are more homogenous as indicated by the difference between the share of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in Mizrahi settlements compared to Ashkenazi settlements (tables 1.1-1.2).

Socioeconomic characteristics: The second main source of data is the socioeconomic index of the residents of the settlement for 2017 calculated by ICBS. The socioeconomic index is a weighted average (using the factor analysis method) of 14 variables, which provide information on the demographic, economic, and social characteristics of the residents of cities, towns and settlements, which are the focus of this study. In addition, I use three variables that are included in the socioeconomic index to represent economic status (average monthly income per capita in the locality), education (percentage of college degree holders aged 27–54 in the locality), and demography (median age of the locality's residents). Finally, the list of control variables also includes the share of immigrants from the 1990s and later, as recorded in the 2008 census, in order to capture potential unique voting patterns.

Table 1.1 presents the characteristics of the residents of the researched settlements alongside those of the general population (Jewish). Compared to the settlements studied here whose origin is classified by surname, the general population is characterized by a significantly larger number of residents, a slightly higher income (2 percent), a higher education (10 percent), and a lower share of Mizrahi. Table 1.2 shows that the economic and demographic characteristics of the 800 settlements classified by continent of birth better represent the general population.

While the socioeconomic characteristics of Mizrahi settlements classified by surname are similar to Mizrahi settlements classified by continent of birth, there are notable differences between the two definitions in the characteristics of Ashkenazi settlements (Tables 1.1–1.2). Ashkenazi settlements using definition 1 are characterized by a significantly lower socioeconomic level compared to Ashkenazi settlements employing definition 2, and this is due to a large proportion of ultra-Orthodox settlements and a low proportion of kibbutzim. An almost uniform distribution characterizes Ashkenazi settlements regardless of the definition of origin (Figure 3).

The degree of religiosity of the settlement: Religiosity is one of the factors found to have a significant effect on voting patterns. Therefore, a definition of the degree of religiosity by settlement is required. In the absence of available data on self-reported religiosity, this work classifies settlements into three groups according to degree of religiosity, based on the description of the settlements in Wikipedia. A settlement is defined as ultra-Orthodox if the description includes the word “Haredi” (the Hebrew name for ultra-Orthodox). For example, regarding the settlement Beit Hilkia it says: "Beit Hilkia is a Haredi settlement in central Israel..." In the same way, a settlement is defined as religious if the description of the settlement in Wikipedia includes the word religious. For example, Kibbutz Lavi classified as religious because the description that appears in Wikipedia is "Lavi is a religious kibbutz that belongs to the religious kibbutz movement..." All other settlements which are not defined either as ultra-Orthodox or religious were grouped together, and are classified here as traditional or secular.

Figure 3





Table 1.1 indicates that the proportion of ultra-Orthodox settlements is higher in the group of Ashkenazi settlements, whereas the proportion of settlements classified as traditional or secular is higher in the group of Mizrahi settlements. The absence of a distinction between traditional and secular hides the fact that Ashkenazi settlements tend to be more secular, while Mizrahi settlements tend to be more traditional (Smooha surveys, Israel Democracy Institute).

Voting patterns by origin and socioeconomic decile: Figure 4 shows the percentage of votes for the bloc of right-wing parties by socioeconomic decile in the last ten elections in Mizrahi, Ashkenazi and mixed settlements by definition of origin. Support for the bloc of right-wing parties decreases as one climbs the socioeconomic scale in both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi communities if the lower decile is ignored (Table 3). The negative correlation between voting for right-wing party bloc and the socioeconomic situation of the residents of the settlement is repeated in all the elections covered here regardless of definition of origin (Figure 4).

In conclusion, the share of votes for the bloc of right-wing parties and the socioeconomic characteristics of the covered settlements are similar to the general (Jewish) population with a better representation of voting patterns using surnames-based definition and a better representation of socioeconomic characteristics employing continent of birth-based definition.

Figure 4



5. FINDINGS

Table 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis of the voting patterns for the 25th Knesset held in November 2022. The first column shows the estimated coefficient of Mizrahi which reflects the voting gap of 25 percentage points between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi settlements (the omitted variable) without control variables. As can be seen, the coefficient of a mixed origin settlement is not significant, implying that the political behavior of this group is similar to Ashkenazi.

The second column in Table 4 shows the estimation results when the socio-economic decile is added as a single control variable. The voting gap remains of a similar size, and is not affected by the inclusion of the socio-economic decile. The negative coefficient of this variable suggests that an increase in the socio-economic decile, which represents a composite index of resources is accompanied by a reduced tendency to vote for the bloc of right-wing parties. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the chances of voting for the bloc of right-wing parties decrease as resources increase. The next section discusses this hypothesis.

The inclusion of income per capita does not significantly change the Mizrahi coefficient (Table 4, third column). In fact, the coefficient of Mizrahi origin increased to about 27 percentage points. The estimated coefficient of the per capita income is negative and significant, and reflects decreasing chances of voting for the bloc of right-wing parties as material economic resources increase. This result stands in contrast to the median voter theory (in one-dimensional elections on tax rate and redistribution), which predicts that voters below the median income will support parties that favor redistribution policies rather than right-wing parties. Note that the seemingly incoherent voting is true also for the voters in the upper part of the income scale, who are more likely to vote for a left bloc (i.e., high taxes) and against their personal economic interest.

The negative correlation between income and voting for the right-wing bloc is part of the solution to the puzzle of why the widening of economic disparities in Israel did not lead to the rise of parties supporting a generous welfare state. In fact, the increase in inequality did not lead to the strengthening of parties that support redistribution in other countries, but to the rise of populist candidates such as Trump, Le Pen, and Modi (Piketty 2021).

An increase in the median age is negatively and significantly correlated with voting for the bloc of right-wing parties, but the inclusion of this variable, which is also a component of the socioeconomic index, does not significantly change the size of the voting gap. It is possible that the median age also captures the degree of religiosity of the residents of the settlement because of the well-known connection in Israel between a religious lifestyle and the number of children. To the extent that median age does capture a degree of religiosity, this finding is consistent with previous studies that revealed the significant impact of religiosity on political behavior. The median age may also represent the tendency of older people to vote to the left.

Estimates of the effect of dummy variables that directly represent the degree of religiosity appear in the fifth column of Table 4, and show that religious settlements are more likely to vote for the right-wing party bloc compared to traditional and secular ones (the omitted variable) and also compared to ultra-Orthodox settlements. It is interesting to see that the inclusion of a religiosity variable does not significantly change the voting gap. The coefficient of Mizrahi origin in the fifth column is only slightly lower compared to the coefficient without control variables. Note that this result could have been different if there were information distinguishing between traditional and secular settlements.

The large immigration wave, which began in the early 1990s, gave birth to two niche parties, "Yisrael Ba'Aliyah" led by former prisoner of Zion Natan Sharansky, which was established in the midst of the immigration wave (1996), and "Yisrael Beitenu", founded three years later by Avigdor Lieberman, who retired from the Likud. These parties tried to attract voters from among the expatriates of the former Soviet Union by promising to promote interests related to their absorption and promotion in Israel. However, it appears that the share of immigrants from 1990 onward has no effect on the vote for the bloc of right-wing parties (Table 4, column 6.) The size of the voting gap is also almost unaffected by the introduction of this variable. In light of these findings, it is not clear whether there is still justification today to separate this group from the rest of the population after more than three decades. One of the two parties has already disappeared, and the other has changed its focus. The current representative and candidates of "Yisrael Beitenu" for the Knesset are not always former USSR expatriates.

A noticeable change in the estimated size of the voting gap for the right-wing party bloc is registered when the level of education (seventh column) is added, which is represented here by the share of those with an academic degree aged 27–54 in the locality. The voting gap for the right decreases from about 25 to less than 20 percentage points. The estimated coefficient of the education variable is negative and significant, and this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the tendency to vote for the right-wing party bloc decreases with the increase in the educational resources. As expected, the size of the voting gap for the right-wing party bloc goes down substantially from 25 to less than 15 percentage points after incorporating a dummy variable Kibbutz in the regression (eighth column of Table 4).

The estimation reveals the disappearance of the voting gap when all the variables are included together (the last column in Table 4). The coefficient of Mizrahi is no longer significant and its size is small, four percentage points. This means that voting for the Knesset is statistically the same regardless of the origin of the residents assuming the same level of education, income, degree of religiosity and median age. Most of the control variables kept their original sign and statistical significance, except for the ultra-Orthodox settlement coefficient, which became negative and significant because its residents vote almost exclusively for ultra-Orthodox parties, which are not included in the bloc of right-wing parties.

In contrast to the voting gap for the right-wing bloc, which disappears after controlling for a list of variables, the voting gap for Likud is considerably smaller, but it is still significant at a size of 10 percentage points (Appendix Table 4). Although the coefficient of income is positive, it becomes negative if education is not controlled for. Immigrants from the 1990s are less likely to vote for Likud, making them more similar to the Ashkenazi in this regard. Finally, the inclination to vote for Likud decreases more significantly, compared to the right-wing bloc, as the level of education of the settlement residents increases.

Table 5 presents a comparative assessment of the ten most recent Knesset elections in order to examine the degree of volatility of the gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in voting for the right-wing party bloc throughout the 2000s. The first row, which serves as a point of reference, shows the raw voting gap without control variables, and is identical to the first column in Table 4 for the last election cycle. In the Knesset elections held in March 2006, the share of votes for right-wing parties in Mizrahi communities is not significantly different from that of Ashkenazi communities. The voting gap was greater in the 18th and 19th Knesset elections and grew to an impressive height in the subsequent elections. In the last six election cycles, a relatively large voting gap was recorded between the two groups of origin, and the peak appeared in the Knesset elections held in November 2022. The increase and decrease in voting for the bloc of right-wing parties was observed in both Mizrahi and Ashkenazi communities, but with greater volatility in Mizrahi communities (Table 2).

The coefficient of the Mizrahi variable is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that the voting gap for the bloc of right-wing parties disappears in all the last ten elections. It implies that voting for the right-wing bloc is the same regardless of origin when the differences in the residents' characteristics such as education and religiosity are controlled for.

A comparative analysis across ten elections reveals that the sign of the coefficients of the control variables, their size, and significance is relatively stable with the exception of the education variable (Table 5). The coefficient of education, which was not significant in the four elections of 2003–13, became significantly negative and large in the last six elections. The reduced political support received by the right-wing from educated voters in the elections to the 25th Knesset represents a new phenomenon that was not observed before. This development in the political behavior of educated people who tend today, more than in the past, to support left-wing parties has also been documented in the US, France, and the UK (Piketty 2021).

Table 6 shows the estimation results in the last ten elections with a definition of origin based on continent of birth. The central findings that were discovered using the definition of surname-based origin—which included sharp fluctuations in the voting gap between elections, the negative effect of education on the share of votes for the right-wing party bloc and a significant reduction in the voting gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi after taking into account the differences in characteristics—are replicated with continent of birth-based origin definition. The decrease in the size of the right-wing voting gap after taking the

characteristics into account is almost the same as the decrease recorded in Table 5. Due to a larger raw voting gap employing a continent of birth-based origin definition, it does not disappear even after controlling for differences in the characteristics of the residents. This difference in the findings stems both from the expansion of investigated settlements (800 compared to 440) and from a difference in the definition of origin.

To isolate the impact of the definition of origin, Table 7 presents results that replicate the estimation in Table 6 but restricted to settlements with available data for surname-based definition (as in Table 5). As in Tables 5-6, the estimation results show a significant decrease in the size of the coefficient of Mizrahi after taking into account the characteristics of the residents, and the sign of the coefficients of the control variables remains unchanged. The trend over time in the education coefficient is preserved. It can also be seen that the estimated size of the Mizrahi coefficient is lower compared to the coefficient estimated in Table 6, and loses its significance in some elections (2003, 2009, 2013, 2015). However, the coefficient of Mizrahi is positive and significant in the last five elections, which apparently indicates the importance of the degree of homogeneity of settlements, which is greater in the continent of birth-based definition.

The estimation results for ten elections are basically similar even if the observations are weighted according to their share in the general population (the weight of an ultra-Orthodox settlement is 10.2 percent, the weight of a kibbutz is 2.8 percent, and the weight of all the rest is 87 percent), and if the characteristics of the residents of the settlements are measured according to the year 2008 in the three elections that took place between 2003 and 2009, or if the ultra-Orthodox parties are added to the bloc of right-wing parties. The main findings on the voting gap remain unchanged even when including in the list of control variables a periphery index or a dummy variable for settlement outside the Green Line, increasing the homogeneity threshold from 10 percent to 12.5 percent or decreasing it to 7.5 percent, or when using a continuous definition of continent of birth-based origin (results are not reported here but can be obtained from the author).

a. The voting gap in voting: urban population

The empirical analysis presented so far is based on the results of voting of Israeli citizens who live in small settlements only. This section explores whether it represents the political behavior of the urban population, which is the majority of Israeli citizens. A supplementary database was built at the level of a statistical area, which is the smallest urban geographic unit for which there are available data on the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents. The ICBS divides municipalities into 1,722 statistical areas, but the empirical analysis is limited only to Jewish statistical areas for which there is data on all the variables necessary for the empirical analysis. Thus, 290 Arab statistical areas and 506 statistical areas without voting data in the last ten elections are dropped.

The actual results in the last ten elections in each of the statistical areas were combined with the socioeconomic characteristics data (income, median age and education) for 2017,

the share of ultra-Orthodox in 2020 (the data before 2020 is unavailable), the composition of residents by continent of birth in 2020 and the share of immigrants in 2008 (the data is unavailable data after 2008).

The empirical analysis of voting patterns is limited to a continent of birth-based definition because statistical areas are too large (thousands of inhabitants) to apply the surname method. Note that the empirical examination is exposed to an ecological fallacy that requires careful interpretation because a statistical area consists of thousands of inhabitants. Similar to the classification of settlements, a statistical area is defined as Mizrahi if it is in the upper quarter according to the percentage of Mizrahi, and a statistical area is defined as Ashkenazi if it is in the lower quarter. Areas between the upper and lower quartiles were defined as mixed.

The analysis of the voting patterns of the urban population presents similar signs but with varying impact sizes for the covered variables. The difference in voting for the right-wing bloc in the elections to the 25th Knesset between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi regions is about 14 percentage points (Table 8). This is a smaller gap than the one found based on the election results in small settlements (about 25 percentage points) when the settlement's origin classification is by surname, and even smaller than the voting gap by origin (42 percent) measured in small settlements applying the same continent of birth-based definition.

Similar to the findings based on small settlement data, the raw voting gap by origin in urban population fluctuated throughout the last ten Knesset election cycles, ranging from 4 percentage points in 2006 to about 18 percentage points in the 2021 election cycle (Table 9). The similarity in the findings also includes the decrease in support received by the right-wing party bloc as one climbs the socioeconomic scale if the two lower deciles are ignored due to the ultra-Orthodox voting patterns (Table 10). As revealed in the empirical examination based on small settlement data, the voting gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi urban areas decreases significantly or disappears in the last elections held in 2022, after controlling for differences in the characteristics of the residents such as education, income, and median age (Table 11). As before, educated voters are less likely to vote for a bloc of right-wing parties in the last six election cycles unlike the previous election cycles (Table 11).

The empirical analysis at the statistical area level is less accurate because the number of residents is larger, and the data is "noisier" relative to an analysis based on small settlements data. The voting gap measured in urban areas is smaller compared to small settlements due to a more heterogeneous composition of residents by origin. The share of Mizrahi in a statistical area classified as Mizrahi is low compared to a settlement classified as Mizrahi, and the share of Ashkenazi in a statistical area classified as Mizrahi is higher compared to a settlement classified as Mizrahi. Despite the reduced accuracy and certain differences in the list of control variables (due to availability), the political behavior of urban population resembles that of small settlements. The consistent results instill confidence in the new method offered here of classifying origin according to surnames in small geographical units, such as settlements.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This study finds sharp fluctuations in the gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi in voting for a right-wing bloc throughout the last ten election cycles, a significant decrease in the voting gap or its disappearance after taking into account the characteristics of the residents, and the distancing of educated people from voting for the right-wing party bloc in the last six elections compared to the four elections that preceded them. These findings are consistently maintained, whether the definition of origin is based on surnames or the continent of birth, and hold true for both small settlements and large urban areas. The similarity between the results obtained from estimating the voting gap using either surname-based definition or the traditional classification by continent of birth suggests that the new classification approach can be employed when data on the continent of birth is unavailable.

The natural concern for the representativeness of the findings regarding small settlements is reduced given that the bloc of right-wing parties received in the investigated small settlements a similar share of the votes as in the general (Jewish) population. The external validity of the results, based on small settlements is further strengthened by the similar picture that emerges examining the data of the urban areas, which cover the majority of the population. In addition, the voting gap for the right-wing parties estimated in this study is similar in size to that found in an election survey based on a representative sample of the Israeli population. The voting gap of 25 percentage points in the elections that took place in April 2019 found here is consistent with a voting gap of 23 percentage points between respondents of Mizrahi and Ashkenazi origin in a survey conducted in that same election (Berman 2020).

Unlike other advanced economies such as the US and the UK, voters of Asian or African descent (i.e., Mizrahi) in Israel are more likely to vote for a right-wing party compared to voters of European or American origin. In the UK, voters of Asian or African descent are less likely to vote for a right-wing party. The voting gap in the UK between white voters and voters of Asian or African descent is 40 percentage points, and the voting gap for the right-wing between white and black voters in the US is 50 percentage points (Piketty 2021). Thus, the voting gap in the UK and the US is opposite to that in Israel. Furthermore, Piketty's research shows that the ethnic gaps in the US, UK, and France are relatively stable over time, in contrast to the volatility recorded in voting gap by origin in Israel.

What explains the voting gap between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi that share important characteristics such as religion, race, language and nationality but differ in their historical origin? While this research is descriptive, it may help to illuminate or cast a shadow on prevailing hypotheses. The protest vote is a common hypothesis in Israel to explain the excessive political support of Mizrahi for the right-wing parties. According to this hypothesis, Mizrahi develop a feeling of resentment due to biased policies against immigrants from Asia and Africa, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. The negative collective emotion fuels the desire to take revenge against parties associated with discrimination against their parents and

grandparents (i.e., Mapai, which is center-left) and rewards the leading opposition party (i.e., Likud, which is center-right), resulting in contemporary voting disparity.

However, the significant fluctuations in the voting gap for the right that were recorded throughout the last ten elections puncture the protest vote hypothesis, which relies on historical events that are inherently constant. The voting gap in the elections held in 2022 was five times the gap in the elections held in 2006, and more than twice that of the elections held in 2009 and 2013. The low percentage of votes for the right-wing bloc in Mizrahi settlements in the 1999 elections, which is not included in this study, implies large fluctuations in the voting gap even if the 2006 election is ignored. Sharp fluctuations in voting patterns by origin were also documented in survey-based studies such as Shamir and Arian (1999), which covered eight elections for the Knesset from 1969 to 1996, as well as in Berman's study (Berman 2021), which analyzed all elections until April 2019.

The protest vote hypothesis that discriminatory policies six decades ago determine current political behavior is not compatible with partial intergeneration transfer of political attitudes. Previous studies indicate that the transmission of voting patterns from generation to generation is limited (Jennings and Niemi 1968, Alford et al. 2005, Jennings and Stoker 2009).⁶ Consequently, one would anticipate a consistent decline in the voting gap as time elapses. Another important piece of evidence, which increases the doubt in the claim that the current political behavior expresses a protest against political parties descended from Ma'pai is the political behavior of Jews of Ethiopian origin who were mostly immigrated in the years when the Likud party held the reins of power, and for whom the Likud is the Ma'pai of the past. Despite the unfavorable way they were absorbed, Jews of Ethiopian origin tend to vote in relatively large proportions for the bloc of right-wing parties, led by Likud, similar to other Israelis in the lower deciles.

The finding that the voting gap disappears after taking into account the differences in socioeconomic characteristics further weakens the hypothesis of a protest vote due to past discrimination. Advocates of that hypothesis should offer an explanation for why excess votes for right-wing parties are mainly limited to Mizrahi with low education. This study shows that Mizrahi with higher education are more likely to vote for the center left parties similar to their Ashkenazi counterparts.

Past discrimination may still affect current political behavior today through its consequences on the education and income gaps between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi that were created in previous generations and passed on to the next generation. The narrowing of education gaps and income inequality between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi documented by Dahan (2013) should work to reduce the voting gap over time.

⁶ Leon and Cohen (2011) attribute the support of Mizrahim for Likud to political and economic equality of opportunity, which was manifested in the equal opening of the ranks of the Herut party, and later the Likud, to local Mizrahi activists from the periphery who climbed according to their qualifications to national positions. However, it is not clear why such a process discouraged voters of Ashkenazi origin from voting for Likud.

However, the roots of some of the differences in education and degree of religiosity are also related to the different diaspora history of the two social groups. The economic and social conditions in host countries in Africa and Asia did not develop like that of Europe, and as a result there were cultural differences and gaps in education and economic resources that the Jewish communities who immigrated to Israel brought with them. For example, GDP per capita in Europe grew at a much faster rate than in Africa and Asia, and set in motion processes that had a differential impact on the lives of Jews in Europe compared to Africa. These processes, among other things, were accompanied by secularization of some of the Jews of Europe, and the emergence of Orthodox society, who felt that their Judaism was in danger. In contrast, the Jews of North Africa were not exposed to the same intensity to these processes, and most of them maintained an affinity to the Jewish tradition in varying degrees. The remnants of these differences are still apparent today in a relatively significant proportion of both secular and ultra-Orthodox individuals among Ashkenazi, compared to a relatively high number of traditionalists within the Mizrahi population. According to recent surveys, the percentage of secular individuals among Ashkenazi is nearly double that among Mizrahi (Smooha surveys, Israel Democracy Institute). These differences have changed only to a limited extent since the late 1960s (Arian 1973: Table 4.2 on page 63). Thus, differences in religiosity and socioeconomic conditions, rooted in historical developments predating immigration to Israel, are partially responsible for the voting disparity today between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi.

The fluctuation in the size of the voting gap for the right-wing parties across elections and the change in the importance of education as a distinguishing factor between right and left voters are surprising. The hypothesis offered here to explain these findings consists of two parts. In the spirit of the distinction made by Mizrahi (2011) between types of solidarity, the first part of the argument is that the voters assign increasing weight to universal solidarity compared to intra-national solidarity as the economic resources and especially the education resource increase. Such a relationship is consistent with a negative correlation between education level and voting for right-wing parties found in this study, and with the findings showing that Israelis are more likely to adopt an Israeli identity than a Jewish one the higher their education (Lewin-Epstein & Cohen 2018). The sense of group belonging behaves like the demand for necessity goods, which decreases with increasing income (Enke, Polborn, and Wu 2022). The negative correlation between education and voting for the right may not only arise from the link between resources and the need for a sense of belonging but also from the positive impact of acquiring an education on the likelihood of adopting a universal liberal worldview concerning human rights and a strong commitment to the protection of minorities.

The second part of the thesis posits that voting fluctuations are influenced by the specific circumstances that gain significant prominence during the election campaign. The political support of voters with limited resources, primarily in terms of education, for right-wing parties will increase if issues related to perceived threats to the "tribe" (the nation) take center

stage in the election agenda. However, if the perceived threat to the tribe is not the focal point, the appeal of other issues will rise, consequently reducing the likelihood of voting for right-wing parties. Center-left citizens with ample resources are more likely to turn out when the perceived threat to human rights plays a central role in the elections. In summary, the fluctuations in voting are derived from an interaction between resources, the significance of human rights relative to social identity, and the unique circumstances of the elections.

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Table 1.1
Descriptive statistics, surname-based definition of origin of settlements

	Researched settlements				Israel (Jewish population only)	
	Ashkenazi settlements	Mizrahi settlements	Mixed settlements	All settlements	Weighted average	Simple average
Number of settlements	63	201	176	440	1,090	1,090
Population, 2020	507	687	641	643	--	7,204
% Asia or Africa origin, 2020	15.8	54.5	28.9	38.8	30.5	30.0
% Europe or America origin, 2020	35.7	10.7	24.2	19.6	34.1	26.3
Vote for the Right-Wing Bloc, Knesset 25	35.5	60.6	39.1	48.4	43.6	41.3
Vote for the Likud, Knesset 25	12.4	39.3	19.9	27.7	20.2	20.6
Socioeconomic index, 2017	0.37	0.45	0.64	0.52	0.21	0.46
Average monthly income, 2017	5,423	5,763	5,991	5,806	5,676	6,039
% with academic degree, 2017	45.8	31.3	44.3	38.6	35.1	39.8
Median age, 2017	30.7	29.3	30.5	30.0	30.7	29.8
% Ultra-Orthodox	7.9	1.0	1.1	2.1	13.3	5.9
% Religious	20.6	23.9	17.1	20.7	.	.
% Traditional and secular	71.4	75.1	82.3	77.4	.	.
% Kibbutzim	41.3	2.0	34.7	20.7	2.8	22.9
% 1990+ immigrants	6.3	2.6	4.1	3.7	13.4	5.5

Table 1.2
Descriptive statistics, continent of birth-based definition of origin of settlements

	Researched settlements				Israel (Jewish population only)	
	Ashkenazi settlements	Mizrahi settlements	Mixed settlements	All settlements	Weighted average	Simple average
Number of settlements	200	200	400	800	1,090	1,090
Population, 2020	747	762	855	805	--	7,204
% Asia or Africa origin, 2020	10.9	60.0	24.6	30.0	30.5	30.0
% Europe or America origin, 2020	39.0	6.7	26.9	24.9	34.1	26.3
Vote for the Right-Wing Bloc, Knesset 25	22.0	64.2	33.3	38.2	43.6	41.3
Vote for the Likud, Knesset 25	7.6	42.7	15.8	20.5	20.2	20.6
Socioeconomic index, 2017	0.55	0.44	0.91	0.70	0.21	0.46
Average monthly income, 2017	5,591	5,798	6,642	6,168	5,676	6,039
% with academic degree, 2017	52.3	28.5	50.9	45.6	35.1	39.8
Median age, 2017	32.0	29.3	30.5	30.5	30.7	29.8
% Ultra-Orthodox	3.5	0.5	1.0	1.5	13.3	5.9
% Religious	12.5	23.6	15.5	16.8	.	.
% Traditional and secular	83.5	75.9	83.7	81.7	.	.
% Kibbutzim	59.5	0.0	32.0	30.9	2.8	22.9
% 1990+ immigrants	5.7	1.8	3.9	3.8	13.4	5.5

A settlement is defined as "Mizrahi" if it falls in the upper quarter of settlements based on the ratio between individuals whose origin is from Asia or Africa and the sum of the two origin groups (according to 2020 data). A settlement is defined as "Ashkenazi" if it falls in the lower quarter of settlements based on the same ratio. The two quarters of settlements between the upper and lower quarters were defined as "Mixed" settlements.

Table 2
Share of votes for the right-wing bloc, by origin and elections

Knesset	Elections date	Mizrahi settlements	Ashkenazi settlements	Mixed settlements	Voting gap
25	November 2022	60.6	35.5	39.1	25.1
24	March 2021	64.9	40.9	43.8	24.0
23	March 2020	59.9	35.1	38.8	24.8
22	September 2019	51.6	32.3	33.9	19.3
21	April 2019	49.2	24.4	27.1	24.8
20	March 2015	48.8	30.4	32.5	18.4
19	January 2013	44.6	30.8	31.1	13.8
18	February 2009	47.2	36.2	35.0	11.0
17	March 2006	30.4	25.2	23.1	5.2
16	January 2003	53.5	35.1	37.0	18.4

The settlement's origin is defined by last names.

The voting gap is calculated as the difference in votes for right-wing bloc between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi settlements.

Table 3
Share of votes for the right-wing bloc in the 25th Knesset, by origin and socioeconomic decile

Decile	Mizrahi settlements	Ashkenazi settlements	Mixed settlements	All settlements
Average	60.6	35.5	39.1	48.4
1	24.2	41.8	35.1	36.4
2	56.7	58.9	62.0	59.6
3	72.7	60.2	62.3	69.1
4	65.2	49.6	49.2	58.1
5	70.1	26.6	39.8	55.8
6	59.9	29.8	43.6	51.5
7	50.2	23.4	29.2	37.6
8	46.2	20.4	31.6	34.2
9	40.3	24.8	25.1	29.3
10	26.9	18.3	19.1	20.0

The origin settlement is defined by last names.

Socioeconomic decile is calculated using a socioeconomic index for the year 2017.

Table 4
Votes for right-wing bloc in the 25th Knesset, surname-based origin of settlement

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Mizrahi	0.251*** (0.038)	0.246*** (0.034)	0.265*** (0.035)	0.228*** (0.034)	0.240*** (0.028)	0.253*** (0.038)	0.195*** (0.042)	0.149*** (0.040)	0.042 (0.033)
Mixed	0.036 (0.041)	0.065* (0.038)	0.059 (0.039)	0.032 (0.036)	0.046 (0.030)	0.037 (0.042)	0.030 (0.043)	0.018 (0.040)	-0.005 (0.026)
Socio-economic Decile		-0.042*** (0.005)							
Income			-0.041*** (0.008)						-0.019** (0.008)
Median Age				-0.017*** (0.003)					-0.012*** (0.003)
Religious					0.296*** (0.024)				0.187*** (0.027)
Ultra-Orthodox					-0.014 (0.072)				-0.430*** (0.131)
Post-1990 immigrants						0.058 (0.182)			-0.269 (0.205)
Education level							-0.383*** (0.101)		-0.450*** (0.086)
Kibbutz								-0.261*** (0.031)	-0.224*** (0.030)
Intercept	0.355*** (0.036)	0.575*** (0.049)	0.580*** (0.061)	0.879*** (0.087)	0.295*** (0.025)	0.351*** (0.037)	0.530*** (0.057)	0.463*** (0.038)	1.127*** (0.101)
Number of observations	440	440	439	439	439	440	439	440	438
R ²	0.186	0.323	0.258	0.378	0.396	0.187	0.225	0.32	0.652

The dependent variable: Share of votes for the right-wing bloc in the 25th Knesset

Settlement origin is defined by last names.

The omitted variable is Ashkenazi settlement.

Socio-economic decile, income (average monthly income per person), median age, and education level (percentage of individuals with academic degrees aged 54-27) are taken from the 2017 socio-economic index data.

Settlement type is defined as Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi), Religious, Traditional, and Secular according to the description in Wikipedia (detailed in the article).

The share of immigrants who arrived in 1990 and onward is taken from 2008 census.

Table 5
Votes for the right-wing bloc, surname-based origin of settlements

Knesset	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Date	Jan 03	Mar 06	Feb 09	Jan 13	Mar 15	Apr 19	Sep 19	Mar 20	Mar 21	Nov 22
Mizrabi (no controls)	0.184*** (0.037)	0.052 (0.036)	0.110*** (0.040)	0.138*** (0.036)	0.184*** (0.034)	0.249*** (0.030)	0.193*** (0.035)	0.248*** (0.036)	0.240*** (0.038)	0.251*** (0.038)
Mizrabi	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.028)	0.017 (0.030)	0.038 (0.028)	0.031 (0.031)	0.045 (0.033)	0.040 (0.031)	0.042 (0.033)
Mixed	-0.031 (0.026)	-0.030 (0.022)	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.026)
Income	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.031*** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)
Median Age	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.010 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.002)	-0.010 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.002)	-0.011 (0.003)	-0.012 (0.003)	-0.012 (0.003)
Religious	0.166*** (0.028)	0.224*** (0.027)	0.199*** (0.027)	0.169*** (0.027)	0.184*** (0.026)	0.138*** (0.020)	0.192*** (0.025)	0.193*** (0.026)	0.196*** (0.026)	0.187*** (0.027)
Ultra-Orthodox	-0.522*** (0.099)	-0.310*** (0.094)	-0.396*** (0.109)	-0.432*** (0.100)	-0.480*** (0.107)	-0.403*** (0.120)	-0.437*** (0.115)	-0.510*** (0.130)	-0.458*** (0.130)	-0.430*** (0.131)
Post-1990 immigrants	-0.368** (0.168)	-0.169 (0.251)	-0.027 (0.234)	-0.191 (0.217)	-0.106 (0.152)	-0.337 (0.242)	-0.064 (0.192)	-0.112 (0.181)	-0.155 (0.185)	-0.269 (0.205)
Education level	-0.135* (0.08)	0.135* (0.075)	-0.003 (0.077)	-0.089 (0.076)	-0.287*** (0.075)	-0.526*** (0.070)	-0.289 (0.079)	-0.405*** (0.085)	-0.398*** (0.085)	-0.450*** (0.086)
Kibbutz	-0.266*** (0.027)	-0.186*** (0.024)	-0.239*** (0.026)	-0.205*** (0.026)	-0.187*** (0.026)	-0.214*** (0.023)	-0.194*** (0.027)	-0.227*** (0.030)	-0.221*** (0.030)	-0.224*** (0.030)
Intercept	0.887*** (0.081)	0.631*** (0.080)	0.897*** (0.083)	0.849*** (0.079)	0.906*** (0.082)	0.947*** (0.077)	0.903*** (0.087)	1.063*** (0.098)	1.129*** (0.098)	1.127*** (0.101)
Number of observations	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438	438
R ²	0.563	0.57	0.594	0.572	0.601	0.702	0.592	0.649	0.653	0.652

Dependent Variable: Share of votes for the right-wing bloc.

Settlement origin is defined by last names. The reference variable is Ashkenazi settlement.

Table 6
 Votes for right-wing bloc, continent of birth-based origin of settlements

Knesset	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Date	Jan 03	Mar 06	Feb 09	Jan 13	Mar 15	Apr 19	Sep 19	Mar 20	Mar 21	Nov 22
Mizrani (no controls)	0.347*** (0.020)	0.162*** (0.020)	0.265*** (0.022)	0.283*** (0.019)	0.332*** (0.019)	0.397*** (0.016)	0.339*** (0.019)	0.418*** (0.020)	0.421*** (0.020)	0.422*** (0.020)
Mizrani	0.117*** (0.028)	0.044* (0.026)	0.090*** (0.026)	0.128*** (0.027)	0.154*** (0.025)	0.188*** (0.027)	0.160*** (0.027)	0.201*** (0.028)	0.197*** (0.029)	0.187*** (0.030)
Mixed	0.038*** (0.013)	0.020* (0.012)	0.039*** (0.014)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.012)	0.041*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.052*** (0.014)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.054*** (0.015)
Income	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.033*** (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.023*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.005)
Median Age	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Religious	0.223*** (0.027)	0.268*** (0.025)	0.255*** (0.026)	0.228*** (0.025)	0.246*** (0.024)	0.175*** (0.018)	0.246*** (0.024)	0.257*** (0.026)	0.259*** (0.027)	0.251*** (0.026)
Ultra-Orthodox	-0.431*** (0.073)	-0.247*** (0.078)	-0.255** (0.109)	-0.320*** (0.073)	-0.347*** (0.076)	-0.209** (0.093)	-0.313*** (0.084)	-0.342*** (0.096)	-0.267** (0.109)	-0.247** (0.108)
Post-1990 immigrants	-0.121 (0.227)	0.115 (0.264)	0.275 (0.242)	0.137 (0.258)	0.187 (0.171)	0.019 (0.316)	0.251 (0.221)	0.238 (0.205)	0.173 (0.239)	0.104 (0.251)
Education level	-0.114 (0.071)	0.131** (0.064)	-0.007 (0.068)	-0.025 (0.066)	-0.159** (0.066)	-0.332*** (0.057)	-0.187*** (0.071)	-0.272*** (0.074)	-0.286*** (0.075)	-0.336*** (0.075)
Kibbutz	-0.238*** (0.018)	-0.171*** (0.016)	-0.212*** (0.018)	-0.165*** (0.016)	-0.148*** (0.016)	-0.145*** (0.015)	-0.144*** (0.017)	-0.163*** (0.018)	-0.165*** (0.019)	-0.162*** (0.019)
Intercept	0.779*** (0.077)	0.584*** (0.076)	0.803*** (0.077)	0.695*** (0.074)	0.730*** (0.072)	0.724*** (0.069)	0.741*** (0.080)	0.860*** (0.088)	0.941*** (0.092)	0.945*** (0.092)
Number of observations	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793	793
R ²	0.681	0.686	0.696	0.695	0.718	0.764	0.703	0.746	0.744	0.744

Dependent Variable: Share of votes for the right-wing bloc

Continent of birth-based definition of origin

The omitted variable is Ashkenazi settlements.

See notes to Table 4.

VOTING GAP BY ORIGIN

Table 7
Votes for right-wing bloc, continent of birth-based origin of settlements

Knesset	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Date	Jan 03	Mar 06	Feb 09	Jan 13	Mar 15	Apr 19	Sep 19	Mar 20	Mar 21	Nov 22
Mizrabi (no controls)	0.271*** (0.036)	0.097*** (0.035)	0.186*** (0.039)	0.213*** (0.035)	0.259*** (0.035)	0.349*** (0.026)	0.263*** (0.035)	0.339*** (0.037)	0.336*** (0.038)	0.342*** (0.038)
Mizrabi	0.055 (0.041)	-0.004 (0.038)	0.044 (0.038)	0.078** (0.039)	0.103*** (0.037)	0.140*** (0.041)	0.107*** (0.041)	0.144*** (0.042)	0.136*** (0.044)	0.123*** (0.046)
Mixed	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.024)	0.008 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.027)	0.005 (0.029)	0.000 (0.029)
Income	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.035*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.007)	-0.019 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.006)	-0.024 (0.007)	-0.021 (0.008)	-0.020 (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.008)
Median Age	-0.009*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Religious	0.148*** (0.030)	0.200*** (0.028)	0.180*** (0.028)	0.151*** (0.027)	0.167*** (0.026)	0.124*** (0.020)	0.175*** (0.026)	0.176*** (0.028)	0.179*** (0.028)	0.171*** (0.028)
Ultra-Orthodox	-0.499*** (0.101)	-0.324*** (0.104)	-0.375*** (0.109)	-0.387*** (0.094)	-0.421*** (0.097)	-0.333*** (0.107)	-0.386*** (0.107)	-0.439*** (0.118)	-0.394*** (0.124)	-0.378*** (0.127)
Post-1990 immigrants	-0.167 (0.229)	0.060 (0.289)	0.246 (0.254)	0.053 (0.274)	0.129 (0.163)	-0.096 (0.360)	0.186 (0.231)	0.169 (0.202)	0.098 (0.239)	0.004 (0.254)
Education level	-0.020 (0.098)	0.215** (0.092)	0.131 (0.094)	0.089 (0.091)	-0.076 (0.092)	-0.296*** (0.084)	-0.090 (0.098)	-0.170 (0.104)	-0.183* (0.105)	-0.254** (0.108)
Kibbutz	-0.272*** (0.029)	-0.207*** (0.025)	-0.249*** (0.028)	-0.206*** (0.027)	-0.182*** (0.027)	-0.204*** (0.024)	-0.193*** (0.028)	-0.216*** (0.031)	-0.213*** (0.031)	-0.217*** (0.032)
Intercept	0.837*** (0.105)	0.638*** (0.107)	0.833*** (0.104)	0.751*** (0.099)	0.789*** (0.097)	0.802*** (0.095)	0.799*** (0.106)	0.922*** (0.120)	0.998*** (0.124)	1.017*** (0.128)
Number of observations	416	416	416	416	416	416	416	416	416	416
R ²	0.59	0.606	0.628	0.61	0.642	0.736	0.628	0.69	0.684	0.683

Dependent Variable: Share of votes for the right-wing bloc

Continent of birth-based definition of origin

Researched settlements: settlements which participate in Table 5 regressions

The omitted variable is Ashkenazi settlement.

See notes to Table 4.

Table 8
Descriptive statistics, continent of birth-based definition of statistical areas

	Mizrahi statistical areas	Ashkenazi statistical areas	Mixed statistical areas	Researched statistical areas	Israel (Jewish population only)
Number of statistical areas	229	232	465	926	1,367
Population, 2020	4,309	3,689	4,276	4,137	4,232
% Asia-Africa Origin, 2020	49.0	17.5	29.9	31.5	31.1
% Europe-America Origin, 2020	21.8	50.3	37.6	36.9	36.4
Vote for the right bloc, Knesset 25	53.8	39.5	43.8	45.2	44.2
Vote for the Likud, Knesset 25	34.6	23.1	27.6	28.2	27.4
Socio-economic index, 2017	-0.214	0.169	0.194	0.087	0.092
Average monthly income, 2017	5,821	5,622	6,663	6,189	5,972
% with academic degree, 2017	24.2	40.9	36.4	34.5	35.0
Median Age, 2017	31.9	36.3	35.0	34.5	33.5
% Ultra-Orthodox	9.6	15.0	9.9	11.1	13.0
% 1990+ immigrants	12.1	20.7	14.9	15.7	15.1

A statistical area is defined as "Mizrahi" based on 2020 data if it falls in the upper quarter of the areas based on the ratio between individuals whose origin is from Asia or Africa and the sum of the two origin groups. An area is defined as "Ashkenazi" if it falls in the lower quarter based on the same ratio. The two quarters of statistical areas between the upper and lower quarters were defined as "Mixed" areas.

The right-wing bloc in the 25th Knesset elections included the following parties: Likud, Religious Zionism, The Jewish Home, and Yisrael Beiteinu.

Table 9**Share of votes for right-wing bloc in statistical areas, by origin and elections**

Knesset	Elections date	Mizrahi statistical areas	Ashkenazi statistical areas	Mixed statistical areas	Voting gap
25	November 2022	53.8	39.5	43.8	14.3
24	March 2021	61.9	43.7	50.0	18.2
23	March 2020	58.8	40.9	46.6	17.9
22	September 2019	53.8	39.2	43.5	14.6
21	April 2019	51.2	33.0	38.5	18.2
20	March 2015	49.7	35.6	39.4	14.1
19	January 2013	43.5	32.6	35.6	10.9
18	February 2009	51.1	40.7	43.3	10.4
17	March 2006	31.5	27.7	27.3	3.8
16	January 2003	51.5	37.3	43.2	14.2

The origin of a statistical area is defined based on the continent of birth in the year 2020.

The voting gap is calculated as the difference in votes for the right-wing bloc between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi statistical areas.

Table 10**Share of votes for right-wing bloc in the 25th Knesset in statistical areas, by origin and socio-economic decile**

Decile	Mizrahi statistical areas	Ashkenazi statistical areas	Mixed statistical areas	All statistical areas
Average	53.8	39.5	43.8	45.2
1	10.0	26.8	23.3	24.9
2	51.2	43.3	46.1	47.3
3	57.0	50.5	54.1	54.9
4	58.8	52.3	55.9	56.0
5	57.6	47.7	52.1	53.2
6	52.1	55.7	50.3	52.2
7	51.2	48.0	48.1	48.9
8	43.5	37.4	39.0	39.5
9	49.2	28.4	36.4	36.0
10	45.2	25.4	31.5	29.4

The origin of a statistical area is defined based on the continent of birth in the year 2020.

Socioeconomic decile is calculated using socioeconomic index for the year 2017.

Table 11
Votes for right-wing bloc, statistical areas

Knesset	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Date	Jan 03	Mar 06	Feb 09	Jan 13	Mar 15	Apr 19	Sep 19	Mar 20	Mar 21	Nov 22
Mizrabi (no controls)	0.142*** (0.012)	0.037*** (0.012)	0.104*** (0.016)	0.104*** (0.016)	0.141*** (0.016)	0.182*** (0.016)	0.146*** (0.017)	0.179*** (0.018)	0.182*** (0.017)	0.143*** (0.015)
Mizrabi	0.074*** (0.013)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.103*** (0.012)	0.103*** (0.012)	0.087*** (0.011)	0.081*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.012)	0.078*** (0.012)	0.067*** (0.013)	0.028 (0.018)
Mixed	0.035*** (0.009)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.017*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.009)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.005 (0.012)
Income	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.005)	-0.034*** (0.005)	-0.035*** (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.039*** (0.005)	-0.042*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.005)
Median Age	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Ultra-Orthodox	-0.460*** (0.029)	-0.236*** (0.027)	-0.432*** (0.027)	-0.432*** (0.027)	-0.553*** (0.025)	-0.568*** (0.024)	-0.646*** (0.026)	-0.700*** (0.028)	-0.736*** (0.031)	-0.501*** (0.040)
Post-1990 immigrants	0.150*** (0.038)	0.603*** (0.038)	0.693*** (0.029)	0.693*** (0.029)	0.536*** (0.028)	0.369*** (0.027)	0.356*** (0.032)	0.401*** (0.032)	0.280*** (0.033)	0.189*** (0.046)
Education level	-0.099*** (0.041)	0.214*** (0.048)	0.069 (0.050)	0.069 (0.050)	-0.111** (0.050)	-0.373*** (0.045)	-0.246*** (0.049)	-0.267*** (0.053)	-0.239*** (0.056)	-0.359*** (0.062)
Intercept	0.718*** (0.042)	0.425*** (0.042)	0.638*** (0.039)	0.638*** (0.039)	0.712*** (0.038)	0.750*** (0.036)	0.798*** (0.040)	0.884*** (0.043)	0.983*** (0.046)	0.887*** (0.056)
Number of observations	924	924	924	924	924	924	924	924	924	924
R ²	0.637	0.625	0.768	0.768	0.821	0.841	0.815	0.827	0.796	0.519

The dependent variable: Share of votes for the right-wing bloc.

The origin of statistical area is defined based on the continent of birth.

The omitted variable is Ashkenazi area.

Apart from that, refer to the notes for Table 4.

Appendix Table 1
List of parties in the right-wing bloc, by elections

Knesset	Election date	Right-Wing Bloc ^a
25	01.11.2022	Likud, HaTzionut HaDatit, HaBait HaYehudi, Yisrael Beiteinu
24	23.03.2021	Likud, HaTzionut HaDatit, Yamina, Yisrael Beiteinu, Tikva Hadasha
23	02.03.2020	Likud, Yamina, Yisrael Beitenu
22	17.09.2019	Likud, Yamina, Yisrael Beitenu
21	09.04.2019	Likud, Ihud Miflagot haYamin, Yisrael Beitenu
20	17.03.2015	Likud, HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beitenu
19	22.01.2013	Likud—Yisrael Beitenu, HaBayit haYehudi
18	10.02.2009	Likud, HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beitenu, haIhud haLeumi
17	28.03.2006	Likud, Yisrael Beitenu, HaIhud HaLeumi-Mafdal
16	28.01.2003	Likud, Mafdal, HaIhud HaLeumi

- a. The parties in the right-wing bloc in elections 16–21 were selected according Berman (2020). Parties were classified in later elections (22–25) using the same approach.
- b. The right-wing bloc includes only parties that surpassed the electoral threshold in the elections.

Appendix Table 2**Share of votes for right-wing bloc in the researched settlements and in the general (Jewish) population**

Knesset elections	Researched settlements Surname-based definition of origin ^a	Researched settlements continent of birth- based definition of origin ^b	Israel (Jewish) ^c
25	0.48	0.38	0.44
24	0.53	0.43	0.49
23	0.48	0.38	0.46
22	0.42	0.34	0.42
21	0.37	0.28	0.37
20	0.40	0.32	0.39
19	0.37	0.30	0.35
18	0.41	0.34	0.43
17	0.27	0.22	0.28
16	0.44	0.36	0.43
Number of settlements	440	833	1053

- a. Jewish settlements with 2,000 residents or fewer, and for which data is available for all ten recent election systems, where four common names represent 10 percent or more of the population.
- b. Jewish settlements with 2,000 residents or fewer, and for which data is available for all ten recent election systems and data on the continent of birth in 2020.
- c. The population includes all Jewish and mixed settlements that appeared in the official election files, excluding "double envelopes." The percentage of votes is calculated as a weighted average based on the valid votes in the settlement from the general population.
- d. The number presented for the national Jewish population is the average number of Jewish settlements in each election system. The number of settlements varies between 1071 (Election 24) and 1023 (Election 17).

Appendix Table 3
Descriptive statistics, by settlement religiosity

Researched settlements	Ultra-Orthodox settlements ^a		Religious settlements ^b		Secular or Traditional settlements	
	Surname-based origin	Continent of birth-based origin	Surname-based origin	Continent of birth-based origin	Surname-based origin	Continent of birth-based origin
Number of settlements	9	12	91	134	339	648
Average income (NIS)	2,790	2,699	4,784	4,829	6,151	6,509
Employment rate (%)	81	81	87	88	87	87
Academic degrees (%)	21	23	40	46	38	46
Median age	17	17	25	23	32	32
Percentage of votes in the 25th elections						
Right-Wing Bloc	34	42	73	75	42	31
Ultra-Orthodox parties	63	56	11	9	6	4
Yahadut HaTorah	47	43	2	2	1	0
Religious Zionism	26	33	34	40	12	8
Shas	16	13	10	7	5	3
Likud	7	7	31	27	27	19
HaBait HaYehudi	2	2	6	7	1	1
Yesh Atid	1	1	5	5	23	30
HaAvoda	0	0	1	1	8	11
HaMahane HaMemlahti	1	1	8	8	14	15
Yisrael Beitenu	0	0	1	1	2	2
Meretz	0	0	1	1	5	8
Hadash-Taal	0	0	0	0	0	0
Balad	0	0	0	0	0	0

- a. A settlement is defined as "Ultra-Orthodox" if the word "Haredi" is included in the settlement's description on Wikipedia. Similarly, a settlement is defined as "Religious" if the word "Religious" is included in the settlement's description. A settlement is defined as "Traditional" or "Secular" if the words "Haredi" or "Religious" are not included in the settlement's description on Wikipedia.
- b. The Researched population includes Jewish settlements with 2,000 residents or fewer, and for which data is available for all ten recent election systems, where four common names represent 10% or more of the population.

Appendix Table 4**Votes for the Likud in the 25th Knesset, statistical areas****The dependent variable: share of votes for Likud in the 25th Knesset**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Mizrahi	0.269*** (0.014)	0.269*** (0.014)	0.268*** (0.014)	0.270*** (0.014)	0.260*** (0.014)	0.264*** (0.015)	0.189*** (0.020)	0.213*** (0.016)	0.103*** (0.018)
Mixed	0.076*** (0.016)	0.080*** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.016)	0.076*** (0.016)	0.067*** (0.015)	0.073*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.018)	0.066*** (0.015)	0.031** (0.014)
Socioeconomic Decile		-0.007** (0.003)							
Income			0.003 (0.004)						0.009** (0.004)
Median Age				0.000 (0.001)					-0.002*** (0.001)
Religious					0.025* (0.015)				0.035** (0.014)
Ultra- Orthodox					-0.128*** (0.032)				-0.306*** (0.064)
Post-1990 immigrants						-0.152 (0.180)			-0.146* (0.080)
Education level							-0.552*** (0.052)		-0.634*** (0.044)
Kibbutz								-0.145*** (0.014)	-0.101*** (0.014)
Intercept	0.124*** (0.010)	0.158*** (0.019)	0.106*** (0.025)	0.121*** (0.030)	0.129*** (0.011)	0.133*** (0.014)	0.376*** (0.031)	0.183*** (0.013)	0.507*** (0.044)
Number of observations	440	440	439	439	439	440	439	440	438
R ²	0.394	0.402	0.395	0.394	0.411	0.398	0.575	0.487	0.706

The settlement origin is defined according to family names.

The omitted variable is an Ashkenazi settlement.

See notes to Table 4.